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CPLR Art. 9: Statute is to be applied liberally to permit class
action certification of plaintiff shareholders with substantially
similar claims in actions against corporate directors
Article 9 of the CPLR provides generally for the maintenance
of class action suits.1 In recent years, such litigation has attained
greater importance as technological advancements and increasingly
sophisticated financial transactions have resulted in common inju-
ries to large numbers of persons.2 The statutory framework gov-
See CPLR 901-909 (1976 & Supp. 1984-1985). CPLR 901 provides in pertinent part-
a. One or more members of a class may sue... as representative parties on
behalf of all if:
1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members.... is impracticable;
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members;
3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of [those] of
the class;
4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class; and
5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and effi-
cient adjudication of the controversy.
CPLR 901 (1976 & Supp. 1984-1985). Before a named plaintiff may proceed on behalf of a
class, he must move for an order permitting the class action. CPLR 902 (1976 & Supp. 1984-
1985). In making its determination, the court will consider:
1. the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecu-
tion or defense of separate actions;
2. the impracticability or inefficiency of... separate actions;
4. the desirability . . . of concentrating the litigation .. . in the particular
forum;
5. the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
CPLR 902 (1976 & Supp. 1984-1985).
2 See Black, Class Actions Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23, 46 TENN.
L. REv. 556, 604 (1979) (advent of "mass technology" renders the standard lawsuit between
two parties ineffectual to resolve "widespread wrongs"); cf. Homburger, State Class Actions
and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. Rav. 609, 610 (1971) (class actions evidenced as useful
beyond expectations); Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action, Part II: Interest,
Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. Rv. 1067, 1121 (1980) (class action developed into
effective way to handle group claims). Several commentators have noted the diverse applica-
tions for class litigation. See, e.g., Floyd, Civil Rights Class Actions in the 1980's: The Bur-
ger Court's Pragmatic Approach to Problems of Adequate Representation and Jus-
ticiability, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (civil rights); Committee Report, Consumer Protection
- The Current Status of New York Class Actions, 38 REc. A.B. CrTy N.Y. 54, 71-72 (1983)
(commercial transactions); Note, Class Actions in New York: Recovery for Personal Injury
in Mass Tort Cases, 30 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1187, 1211 (1979) (tort actions).
Moreover, the class action is especially suited to situations in which the small size of a
plaintiff's individual claim makes independent litigation impracticable. See, e.g., Letter
from Federal District Judge Gus J. Solomon to Sen. Warren G. Magnuson (Nov. 24, 1970),
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erning class actions was revised in 1975,3 theoretically ending more
than a century of judicially imposed restrictions on class actions.4
reprinted in 117 CONG. REc. 3915 (1971) ("[a] citizen with a valid justiciable claim of under
$500 is faced with the prospect of having his expenses exceed any recovery obtainable in
court"); T. BARTSH, F. BODDY, B. KING, P. THOMPSON, A CLASs-ACTION SUIT THAT WORKED:
Tim CONSUMER REFUND IN THE ANTIoTc ANTITRUST LITIGATION 883 (1978) (multi-million
dollar lawsuits involving large numbers of consumers can be effectively managed at accept-
able costs). The class action device can be particularly appropriate in cases in which disas-
ters cause injury to many persons. See Note, supra, at 1187. Despite purported utility of
class actions, statistics indicate a decline in the number of class actions filed in federal court
and a similar drop in the proportion of class actions to all civil claims, possibly evincing a
decline in the impact of class action litigation. See In Camera, 7 CLASS ACTION REP. 253, 253
(1982).
1 See CPLR 1005, ch. 308, § 4, [1962] N.Y. Laws 316 (repealed 1975) (current version at
CPLR 901-909 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1984-1985)). New York's first civil practice statute,
the Field Code, was amended in 1849 to provide for maintenance of class actions. See New
York Civil Procedure (Field Code), ch. 438, § 119, [1849] N.Y. Laws 639. Changes were
made in the original statute a quarter century later, see Code Civ. Proc., ch. 448, § 448,
[1876] N.Y. Laws 85, and again in 1920, see Civ. Proc. Act, ch. 925, § 195, [1920] N.Y. Laws
85, but it was not until 1962 that class representatives were required to prosecute claims of
the entire class, see CPLR 1005, ch. 318, § 4, [1962] N.Y. Laws 316 (repealed 1975).
4 See H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS, A MANUAL FOR GROUP LITIGATION AT FEDERAL AND
STATE LEVELS 346 (1977); Homburger, supra note 2, at 631-32; see also Gaynor v. Rockefel-
ler, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 129, 204 N.E.2d 627, 631, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584, 590 (1965) (CPLR 1005 was
merely "verbatim restatement" of former law, thus requiring denial of certification when
separate wrongs were involved); Society Milion v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282,
292-93, 22 N.E.2d 374, 377 (1939) (court refused to permit class action despite similar inju-
ries among members of plaintiff class); Booton v. City of Brooklyn, 15 Barb. 375, 391 (1853)
(strictly applying class action device would render justice "unattainable" because concluding
suit of almost 600 plaintiffs would be "utterly impossible"). By 1972, discontent with New
York's law had reached large proportions. See Homburger, supra note 2, at 613. It was
widely recognized that the New York rule did not reach the heights of the ambitious federal
rule. See Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 33 N.Y.2d 304, 313, 307 N.E.2d 554, 558, 352
N.Y.S.2d 433, 439 (1973). While affirming a lower court's decision to dismiss a class action
suit, the Moore Court indicated that the class action statute should be construed more
broadly than it had in the past. Id. at 313, 307 N.E.2d at 558, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
The new approach embodied in Article 9 was widely hailed as a modern, flexible substi-
tute for its outmoded predecessor. See Evans v. City of Johnstown, 97 App. Div. 2d 1, 2, 470
N.Y.S.2d 451, 452 (3d Dep't 1983) (Article 9 provides "flexible" and "functional" method
for conducting class actions); SIEGEL § 139, at 174 (Article 9 is "enlightened and powerful"
statute). Governor Carey referred to the new law as an "historic advance" for the protection
of New Yorkers. Governor's Memorandum (N.Y.S. 1309-B, N.Y.A. 1252-B, 198th Sess.), re-
printed in [1975] N.Y. Laws 1748 (McKinney). Article 9 was designed to parallel the federal
rule in its liberal allowance of class action suits. See Note, supra note 2, at 1191-92 & n.32;
see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23; Memorandum of Assemblyman Fink 1, 3 (accompanying N.Y.S.
1309-B, N.Y.A. 1252-B, 198th Sess.) (1975) (proposed Article 9 would "embody the virtues
of the federal rule in a simplified and more flexible version ... with ... guidelines for...
judicial discretion").
Although it generally is stated that Article 9 is modeled on the federal rule, an unusual
sequence of events shaped the concepts of Article 9. See [1974] N.Y. Laws 1798 (McKin-
ney). The current version of Rule 23 was patterned after a 1952 New York proposal, and
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However, since enactment of the new law, its application has been
notably inconsistent,5 and many courts have perceived Article 9 as
little more than a reenactment of the former, more rigid statute.6
Recently, in Brandon v. Chefetz,7 the Appellate Division, First De-
partment, held that Article 9 could not be invoked to bar certifica-
tion of plaintiff shareholders who had substantially similar legiti-
mate claims against corporate directors for breach of fiduciary
duty involving, inter alia, failure to disclose material information
relating to a pending tender offer.8
In Brandon, two controlling shareholders of Wells Manage-
ment Corp. (Wells) allegedly diverted to themselves a significant
portion of a tender offer by BIS, S.A. (BIS).9 Plaintiffs sought cer-
tification to represent all shareholders who allegedly were de-
frauded by defendants' procurement of lucrative employment con-
tracts with BIS, which, plaintiffs claimed, artificially diminished
the price per share.10 Plaintiffs claimed that defendants' failure to
disclose details of the employment agreements was a breach of fi-
duciary duty.11 The Supreme Court, in three orders spanning seven
months, denied class certification with leave to renew the motion
after additional discovery to evaluate whether New York was the
most appropriate forum.1 2 On appeal, the Appellate Division modi-
fied and granted certification.13
part of Rule 23 is "substantially identical" to an earlier New York proposal. Homburger,
supra note 2, at 631. See generally The Survey, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 189, 191 n.64 (1975)
(similarities between Article 9 and Rule 23).
' Compare Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 63 App. Div. 2d 11, 12-13, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196,
197-98 (2d Dep't) (certification refused because type of injuries might differ from one plain-
tiff to another), dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1031, 413 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978) with
Vickers v. Home Fed. Say., 56 App. Div. 2d 62, 65, 390 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (4th Dep't 1977)
(different character or amount of remedies sought among different named plaintiffs will not
affect their ability to represent class).
6 See, e.g., Brodsky v. Selden Sanitary Corp., 85 App. Div. 2d 612, 614-15, 444 N.Y.S.2d
949, 951 (2d Dep't 1981); Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 63 App. Div. 2d 11, 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d
196, 207 (2d Dep't), dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1031, 413 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978).
106 App. Div. 2d 162, 485 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1st Dep't 1985).
8 Id. at 168-70, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 59-61. The court relied largely on the proposition that
Article 9 is to be construed liberally. Id. (quoting Friar v. Vanguard Holding Corp., 78 App.
Div. 2d 83, 91-92, 434 N.Y.S.2d 698, 703 (2d Dep't 1980)).
1 Brandon, 106 App. Div. 2d at 163-64, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 56-57. Wells, a New York cor-
poration that traded on the over-the-counter market, was the subject of a takeover by BIS,
S.A., a Delaware corporation. Id. at 163-64, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 56.
10 Id. at 164-65, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 56-57.
Id. at 164, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 57.
12 Id. at 165-66, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
3 Id. at 172, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
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Writing for the court, Judge Asch gave great credence to an
earlier case, Friar v. Vanguard Holding Corp.,14 in which the Ap-
pellate Division, Second Department, stated that Article 9 should
be "broadly construed." 15 The Brandon court reasoned that a nar-
row construction of Article 9 would effectively preclude injured
parties from adjudicating their claims.16 The court concluded that
a named plaintiff's lack of reliance on the defendant's misconduct
was of little relevance when the action was based upon breach of a
simple duty owed to all class members. The court further postu-
lated that plaintiffs' failure to join two directors as defendants,
with whom the named plaintiffs had personal or familial relation-
ships, was irrelevant to the typicality of their claims or to the ade-
quacy of the representation that they would provide.18 Further-
more, the court ruled that discovery for the purpose of ascertaining
the appropriateness of the forum should not be a prerequisite to
certification."9
Although the court properly certified the class action to pro-
ceed, it is suggested that the court unduly emphasized the viability
of the action absent certification, forfeiting an opportunity to es-
tablish guidelines for determining when class actions should be
permitted. Despite the court's purported reliance on the "liberal"
statute, it noted that denial of class certification of the plaintiffs in
78 App. Div. 2d 83, 434 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2d Dep't 1980).
15 Brandon, 106 App. Div. 2d at 168, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 59. (quoting Friar v. Vanguard
Holding Corp., 78 App. Div. 2d 83, 91, 434 N.Y.S.2d 698, 703 (2d Dep't 1980)). The Friar
court recognized that courts have been reluctant to effectuate a liberal class action policy,
and that this reluctance has denied access to the courts to those whose damages are out-
weighed by the costs of litigation. See 78 App. Div. 2d at 92, 95, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 704, 706;
see also supra note 2 (discussing benefits derived from class action suits to those litigants
with relatively minor damages).
6 See Brandon, 106 App. Div. 2d at 168-70, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 60-61 (citing Friar, 78
App. Div. 2d at 93-95, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 205-06). Narrow construction would especially harm
plaintiffs in cases in which the aggregate sum of the class' injuries is substantial, but indi-
vidually the damages would be too nominal to justify aggressive litigation. Brandon, 106
App. Div. 2d at 169, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 60 (quoting Friar, 78 App. Div. 2d at 94, 434 N.Y.S.2d
at 705). This would close the doors of the courts to potential suits, thus condoning "'legal-
ized theft."' Brandon, 106 App. Div. 2d at 169, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 60 (quoting Friar, 78 App.
Div. 2d at 94, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 705).
17 106 App. Div. 2d at 167, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 58-59. The court asserted that defendants'
breach of fiduciary duty affected all shareholders regardless of the extent of plaintiffs'
knowledge of defendants' actions. Id. at 167, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 58. The question of reliance in
such a case was "at best a matter of defense to be interposed with respect to individual
claims after there has been a determination of liability." Id. at 168, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
" See id. at 165, 170-71, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 57-58, 61.
'" Id. at 171-72, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 61-62.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:200
the instant case would likely bar any class action for the wrongdo-
ings alleged because of the lack of a practical alternative.20 It is
suggested that such a consideration is actually a conservative anal-
ysis to apply in certifying a class action because only cases that
would terminate but for class certification would be certified, con-
trary to the intended liberal application of the statute.2
Courts should apply the oft-ignored guidelines provided in
CPLR 902, which expressly require courts to consider several spe-
cific factors when determining the propriety of class certification. 22
It is submitted that, although courts typically refer to this statute
only for its provisions governing the required showing that the
plaintiff must make to serve as a class representative,23 courts,
such as the one in Friar v. Vanguard Holding Corp.,2" apply these
factors without acknowledging their source.25 In the interest of
comity and to give effect to the liberal intentions of the drafters of
20 See id. at 167, 171, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 59, 61. Initially, the Brandon court stated that
when the shareholders' failure to tender would have placed them in an untenable bargaining
position, and when an attempt at a federal court injunction failed, class action was proper
because "[a]ll the members of the class had no practical alternative." Id. at 167, 485
N.Y.S.2d at 59. Similarly, the court noted that, when other avenues of relief are blocked, a
court should not bar a plaintiff/class recovery on technicalities. See id. Finally, the court
stated that, if the present plaintiffs were not able to gain class certification, there probably
would not be any class action commenced in this case. See id.
21 See, e.g., Brodsky v. Selden Sanitary Corp., 85 App. Div. 2d 612, 616, 444 N.Y.S.2d
949, 954 (2d Dep't 1981) (Lazer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (majority lost
sight of "clear intent" of Article 9); Shook v. Lavine, 49 App. Div. 2d 238, 243, 374 N.Y.S.2d
187, 193 (4th Dep't 1975) (statute vests discretion in court to determine whether class action
is desirable and feasible); see SIEGEL § 139, at 174; see also CPLR 104 (requiring liberal
construction of entire CPLR).
22 See supra note 1 (text of CPLR 902).
22 See Shook v. Lavine, 49 App. Div. 2d 238, 243, 374 N.Y.S.2d 187, 193 (4th Dep't
1975) (failure to make motion for class certification within 60-day period required by CPLR
902 can bar certification).
2, 78 App. Div. 2d 83, 434 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2d Dep't 1980).
2 See id. at 96-100, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 706-08. In certifying a class, the Appellate Division
in Friar looked to the provisions of CPLR 901, and determined that all prerequisites to
plaintiffs' classification as adequate class representatives were present. Id. However, the
court failed to apply the criteria of CPLR 902, see id., a step the court must take "only if
[it] finds that the prerequisites under section 901 have been satisfied," CPLR 902. Thus,
although the court mentioned the inefficiency of having 300 separate cases on the same
issue, see Friar, 78 App. Div. 2d at 98-99, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 708, the fact that no other similar
litigation had previously been commenced, id. at 99, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 708, and the fact that
once the common issues were settled, the liability issues were "easily disposed of," id. at 98,
434 N.Y.S.2d at 707-08, the court neglected to note that these criteria actually stem from
CPLR 902, subsections (2), (3), and (5), respectively, see id at 97-100, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 707-
08.
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Article 9, courts should cite and apply the CPLR 902 factors.2 6
Notwithstanding the plaudits of at least one segment of the
New York legal community,27 the Brandon court cannot be per-
ceived as the ultimate arbiter of the rights of Article 9 litigants,
especially because of the Court of Appeals' silence on the matter.2s
The Brandon decision should properly be read as merely one de-
termination in a disparate litany of decisions observing the area of
class certification.
Michael S. Haber
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
CPL § 210.20(2): Compliance with direction of trial judge does
not excuse defendant's failure to make timely motion to dismiss
grounded upon denial of statutory speedy trial right
Under section 210.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law of New
York,1 to obtain a dismissal of an indictment based upon an al-
leged denial of the right to a speedy trial,2 a defendant must file a
28 The Brandon court cited CPLR 902 as the source for the trial court's decision to
institute further discovery on the issue of the management of Brandon as a class action in a
New York forum. See 106 App. Div. 2d at 166, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 58. Similarly, the court in
Boulevard Gardens Tenants Action Comm., Inc. v. Boulevard Gardens Hous. Corp., 88
Misc. 2d 98, 388 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1976), stated that a class could only
be certified when the "considerations set forth in CPLR 901 and 902" are taken into ac-
count. Id. at 101, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 218. While these cases at least mention CPLR 902, the
factors enumerated in CPLR 902 should be considered more carefully when making the
class certification decision. See Long Island College Hosp. v. Whalen, 84 Misc. 2d 637, 638,
377 N.Y.S.2d 890, 891-92 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1975) (plaintiffs had to comply with
provisions of CPLR 902 prior to certification of class), rev'd on other grounds, 68 App. Div.
2d 274, 416 N.Y.S.2d 841 (3d Dep't 1979).
27 See Dickerson, Class Actions Under Article 9 of CPLR-Faith Restored, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 8, 1985, at 1, col. 3. Dickerson hailed the Brandon court's statement regarding liberal
construction of Article 9 as "the most exciting aspect" of the decision. Id. at 7, col. 2. Dick-
erson further stated that the "decision restores our personal faith in the utility of Article 9."
Id. at 7, col. 2.
28 Id. at 7, col. 1. Dickerson noted the "refusal" of the Court of Appeals to address
questions of class certification and clarify "the substantial policy differences" between the
various judicial departments. Id.
CPL § 210.20 (1982).
2 See id. § 30.20 (1982). Unlike most other states, the right to a speedy trial in New
York is not guaranteed in the state constitution, but instead is provided for by statute. See
id.; BROWNELL, CraM. PROC. N.Y., PT. 1. 38:02, at 2-3 (3d ed. 1982). Section 30.20(1) provides
